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A06653 Summary:

BILL NOA06653
 
SAME ASSAME AS S04572
 
SPONSORLentol
 
COSPNSRLifton, Gantt, Griffin, Ramos, Buchwald, Blake, Rozic, Fahy, Ortiz, Seawright, Wright, Barron, Reyes, Richardson, Weprin, Englebright, Simon, Dinowitz, Jean-Pierre, Jaffee, Darling, Romeo, Jacobson, Gottfried, Fernandez, Crespo, Nolan, Rosenthal L, Dickens, Mosley, Rivera, Taylor, Cruz, Perry, Bronson, Epstein
 
MLTSPNSRCook, Galef, Hevesi
 
Add §40.51, CP L
 
Authorizes prosecution where a person receives a presidential reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency when certain conditions are met.
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A06653 Memo:

NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION
submitted in accordance with Assembly Rule III, Sec 1(f)
 
BILL NUMBER: A6653
 
SPONSOR: Lentol
  TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to presidential reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency and previous prosecution   SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS Section 1 of the bill amends the criminal procedure law by adding a new section 40.51 establishing additional circumstances under which a prose- cution is considered not to have occurred for the purposes of criminal procedure law section 40.20's bars on successive prosecutions. The new section states that, despite the occurrence of proceedings otherwise constituting a prosecution, as described in subdivision one of section 40.30 of the criminal procedure law, a prosecution is not considered to have occurred if a person has been granted a reprieve, pardon, or other form of clemency for the offense by the President of the United States, and: 1) such person served in or was employed by the executive branch of the government of the united states on the executive staff of the president, in the executive office of the president, or in an acting or confirmed capacity in a position subject to confirmation by the united states senate, was directly or indirectly employed by, or acted as an agent of, the election, transition, or re-election campaign of the president, or any for-profit or not-for-profit entity owned or controlled by the pres- ident granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency; 2) such person is related by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth degree to the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency; 3) such person bears accessorial liability or conspiratorial liability, for such offense with one or more persons described in subdivisions one or two of this section; 4) the president who granted such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency to such person was thereby aided in avoiding potential prose- cution or conviction, or knowingly obtained a benefit from such offense, or knowingly obtained a tangible, material benefit from or on behalf of such person; or 5) such person possessed or possesses information material to the deter- mination of any criminal or civil investigation, enforcement action or prosecution of the president granting such reprieve, pardon or other form of clemency, or of one or more persons described in subdivision one, two or three of this section. Section 2 of the bill is the effective date.   JUSTIFICATION: The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu- tion protects individuals from being prosecuted twice for the same federal offense, an important principle of criminal justice with roots in common law. In 1969, the U.S. Supreme Court held in Benton v. Mary- land that the Double Jeopardy clause also applies to the states, through incorporation via the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibiting successive pros- ecutions of an individual for the same state offense. Article I, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution, enacted prior to the Benton deci- sion, similarly protects individuals from being prosecuted twice for the same state offense. The U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the Double Jeopardy clause does not prohibit an individual from being prosecuted by two sovereign entities for the same criminal conduct (see, e.g. United States v. Lanza (1922)). This doctrine, known as the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, means there is no constitutional bar under the Double Jeopardy Clause to an individual being prosecuted by the federal government and a state - or by two separate states for offenses arising out of the same conduct. Notwithstanding the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, Article 40 of New York's Criminal Procedure Law grants additional statutory protection to indi- viduals, shielding them from prosecution for state offenses if they have already been prosecuted for the same act or criminal transaction by the federal government or another state (CPL § 40.20) unless an exception applies. A prosecution is considered to have occurred when the elements of CPL § 40.30(1) have been met (i.e., when jeopardy attaches). Over the years, the Legislature has created several exceptions to this protection, allowing successive state prosecution in circumstances where statutory jeopardy would otherwise have attached. Some of these exceptions are located in subdivisions two through four of CPL § 40.30, whereas others are stated in paragraphs (a)-(i) of subdivision two of CPL § 40.20. The first set of exceptions generally focuses on the continuing validity of the prior proceeding: whether it has been nulli- fied by court order, lacked jurisdiction, or was for a lesser offense and procured by the defendant to avoid prosecution for a greater offense. While the President has broad power to issue reprieves, pardons and other forms of clemency for federal offenses pursuant to Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, the power does not extend to grant- ing clemency for state offenses. Article IV, Section 4 of the New York Constitution grants that power to the Governor. The protection from successive federal and state prosecutions found in Article 40 of the Criminal Procedure Law was not intended to foreclose state prosecution in the rare occurrence of the President effectively nullifying federal criminal prosecution by granting executive clemency. It is appropriate, when the State's substantial interest in enforcement of criminal law within its borders is not advanced by a federal prose- cution because of a presidential pardon, that the State not foreclose itself from pursuing important prosecutions prematurely. Indeed, the U.S. Department of Justice's own policy-known as the Petite Policy-for deciding when to bring a federal prosecution after a state prosecution already has occurred focuses in large measure on whether the federal interest in a case has been left unvindicated by the prior state prose- cution. This legislation would create an additional exception to Article 40's prohibition on successive prosecutions by allowing a state prosecution of an offense for which an individual has received a pardon, reprieve, or other form of clemency by the President under Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution in specific instances where the President has a clear conflict of interest. This statutory change would preserve the discretion of New York's prosecutors to pursue state prosecution arising out of criminal acts or transactions over which they otherwise have jurisdiction. To ensure that Article 40's prohibition against successive prosecutions would not interfere with a President's ability to issue good faith pardons to those who have repaid a meaningful debt to society for their federal offenses, the exception only applies to instances where a Presi- dential pardon represents a clearly defined conflict of interest. Moreover, this legislation would not extend the statute of limitations for any offense under State law or change the elements of any criminal offense under State law.   PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY S.8236-2018/A.10422-2018   FISCAL IMPLICATIONS: None.   EFFECTIVE DATE: This act shall take effect immediately, and shall apply to offenses committed on or after the date this act shall have become a law, and shall also apply to offenses committed before such date, where the proceedings specified in subdivision one of section 40.30 of the crimi- nal procedure law have not occurred as of such date.
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