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A03055 Summary:

BILL NOA03055A
 
SAME ASNo Same As
 
SPONSORAubry (MS)
 
COSPNSRPerry, Arroyo, Barron, Blake, Cook, Crespo, Davila, Kim, Pichardo, Pretlow, Richardson, Bichotte, Gottfried, Sepulveda, Otis, Jean-Pierre, Skartados, Joyner, Rosenthal L, Mosley, Peoples-Stokes, Rozic, Rodriguez, Hyndman, Weprin, Carroll, De La Rosa, Jaffee, Dickens, Espinal
 
MLTSPNSREnglebright, Ramos, Simon
 
Amd 30.30 & 180.85, CP L
 
Relates to time limits for a speedy trial.
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A03055 Actions:

BILL NOA03055A
 
01/25/2017referred to codes
01/30/2017reported
02/02/2017advanced to third reading cal.40
02/07/2017amended on third reading 3055a
02/14/2017passed assembly
02/14/2017delivered to senate
02/14/2017REFERRED TO CODES
01/03/2018DIED IN SENATE
01/03/2018RETURNED TO ASSEMBLY
01/03/2018ordered to third reading cal.247
03/19/2018passed assembly
03/19/2018delivered to senate
03/19/2018REFERRED TO CODES
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A03055 Memo:

NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION
submitted in accordance with Assembly Rule III, Sec 1(f)
 
BILL NUMBER: A3055A
 
SPONSOR: Aubry (MS)
  TITLE OF BILL: An act to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to time limits for a speedy trial   PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL: This bill amends section 30.30 of the Criminal Penal Law to ensure cases go to trial in a reasonable timeframe.   SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS: Section 1: Establishes that this act shall be known as "Kalief's Law" Section 2: Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law is amended by: *Allowing the court, whenever a prosecutor states the people are ready for trial, to make an inquiry as to the people's actual readiness. If, after conducting its inquiry, the court determines the people are not ready, the statement or notice of readiness shall not be valid. *Requiring a statement of trial readiness be accompanied or preceded by a certification of good faith compliance with the disclosure require- ments set forth in section 240.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law. *Requiring that exclusions to the computation of time, when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness made by the People, be accompanied by supporting facts and approved by the court. The court shall inquire on the record as to the reasons for the people's unread- iness. *Requiring that at each court, appearance date preceding the commence- ment of trial in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practica- ble to so, shall rule on whether the adjournment period immediately following the court appearance date is to be included or excluded for the purposes of computing time within which the people must be ready for trial. *Clarifying that for purposes of subdivision two of Section 30.30 of the Criminal Procedure Law, no time attributable to court congestion shall be excluded.   JUSTIFICATION: Kalief Browder spent three years jailed at Rikers Island, on a charge for which he was never tried or convicted. He was released in March 2013, having spent more than 700 days in solitary confinement. On June 6, 2015, Kalief committed suicide, a final and permanent indictment of New York's "speedy trial" statute. In May 2010, 16-year-old Kalief Browder was arrested for stealing a backpack. While awaiting the basic American right of a speedy trial, Kalief had 31 court dates during his three years in jail, despite New York's so-called "speedy trial" statute, which says that the People must be ready for trial within six months for felony charges; 90 days for Class A Misdemeanors; 60 days for Class B Misdemeanors; and 30 days for violations. Unfortunately, this case is not unique. According to a 2013 WNYC story, in 2013, about 1,500 people had been in NYC jails for more than a year awaiting trial. Another 2013 report found that 8,063 felony cases had been pending more than six months. And a 2013 New York Times article stated that in 2011 there were 141 pending cases in which the defendant was in jail three or more years citywide. Another 2013 New York Times article reported that in the Bronx, where Browder was arrested, the median length of a case from arrest to disposition was 517 days, and more than 70 percent of felony cases surpassed New York's "speedy trials" guidelines. According to a 2013 WNYC story, in 2010, nearly 100 defendants spent more than a year in jail but were never convicted of a crime. Under current statute, prosecutors are allowed to declare readiness for trial by simply stating they are ready. At the very next court date, the People can declare themselves "not ready" and ask for an adjournment. Yet, even though it may take multiple weeks to get a court date, the prosecution is only clocked for the adjournment period it requested. As a 2014 New Yorker article pointed out, "Every time a prosecutor stood before a judge in Browder's case, requested a one-week adjournment, and got six weeks instead, this counted as only one week against the six- month deadline." Kalief's Law will reduce undue delay by requiring the court to approve exclusions when a statement of unreadiness has followed a statement of readiness, and having the court rule on the number of days that should be included for speedy trial purposes. Kalief's Law will ensure that a statement of "readiness" is real by tying it to discovery requirements, requiring the People to possess evidence that they are in fact "ready" for trial while allowing for flexibility when the facts merit additional time. According to a 2014 New York Law Journal article, "A solution to the intertwined problems of extended pretrial incarceration and discov- ery delay is to reunite the concepts of trial readiness and discovery compliance."   PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: A.8296-A was referred to codes in 2015 and 2016.   EFFECTIVE DATE: This act shall take effect on the sixtieth day after it shall have become law.
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A03055 Text:



 
                STATE OF NEW YORK
        ________________________________________________________________________
 
                                         3055--A
                                                                 Cal. No. 40
 
                               2017-2018 Regular Sessions
 
                   IN ASSEMBLY
 
                                    January 25, 2017
                                       ___________
 
        Introduced  by M. of A. AUBRY, PERRY, ARROYO, BARRON, BLAKE, COOK, CRES-
          PO, DAVILA, KIM, PICHARDO, PRETLOW, RICHARDSON,  BICHOTTE,  GOTTFRIED,
          SEPULVEDA,  OTIS,  JEAN-PIERRE,  SKARTADOS, JOYNER, ROSENTHAL, MOSLEY,
          PEOPLES-STOKES, ROZIC, KAVANAGH, RODRIGUEZ, HYNDMAN, HARRIS --  Multi-
          Sponsored  by  -- M.  of A. ENGLEBRIGHT, FARRELL, RAMOS, SIMON -- read
          once and referred to the Committee on Codes -- reported  from  commit-
          tee,  advanced  to  a  third  reading,  amended and ordered reprinted,
          retaining its place on the order of third reading
 
        AN ACT to amend the criminal procedure law, in relation to  time  limits
          for a speedy trial
 
          The  People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assem-
        bly, do enact as follows:
 
     1    Section 1. This act shall be known and may be cited as "Kalief's law".
     2    § 2. Section 30.30 of the criminal procedure law, as added by  chapter
     3  184  of  the  laws of 1972, paragraph (a) of subdivision 3 as amended by
     4  chapter 93 of the laws of  2006,  paragraph  (a)  of  subdivision  4  as
     5  amended by chapter 558 of the laws of 1982, paragraph (c) of subdivision
     6  4 as amended by chapter 631 of the laws of 1996, paragraph (h) of subdi-
     7  vision  4  as added by chapter 837 of the laws of 1986, paragraph (i) of
     8  subdivision 4 as added by chapter 446 of the laws of 1993, paragraph (j)
     9  of subdivision 4 as added by chapter 222 of the laws of 1994,  paragraph
    10  (b)  of  subdivision  5  as  amended by chapter 109 of the laws of 1982,
    11  paragraphs (e) and (f) of subdivision 5 as added by chapter 209  of  the
    12  laws of 1990, is amended to read as follows:
    13  § 30.30 Speedy trial; time limitations.
    14    1.  Except as otherwise provided in subdivision [three] four, a motion
    15  made pursuant to paragraph (e) of subdivision one of section  170.30  or
    16  paragraph (g) of subdivision one of section 210.20 must be granted where
    17  the people are not ready for trial within:

         EXPLANATION--Matter in italics (underscored) is new; matter in brackets
                              [ ] is old law to be omitted.
                                                                   LBD07703-08-7

        A. 3055--A                          2
 
     1    (a)  six  months  of  the  commencement of a criminal action wherein a
     2  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
     3  felony;
     4    (b)  ninety  days  of  the commencement of a criminal action wherein a
     5  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
     6  misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more than  three
     7  months and none of which is a felony;
     8    (c)  sixty  days  of the commencement of a criminal action wherein the
     9  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
    10  misdemeanor punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of  not  more  than
    11  three  months  and  none of which is a crime punishable by a sentence of
    12  imprisonment of more than three months;
    13    (d) thirty days of the commencement of a criminal action  wherein  the
    14  defendant is accused of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a
    15  violation and none of which is a crime.
    16    2.  Except  as provided in subdivision [three] four, where a defendant
    17  has been committed to the custody of the sheriff in a criminal action he
    18  must be released on bail or on his own recognizance,  upon  such  condi-
    19  tions  as  may  be  just and reasonable, if the people are not ready for
    20  trial in that criminal action within:
    21    (a) ninety days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
    22  of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused  of
    23  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a felony;
    24    (b) thirty days from the commencement of his commitment to the custody
    25  of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
    26  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor  punishable
    27  by  a  sentence  of  imprisonment  of more than three months and none of
    28  which is a felony;
    29    (c) fifteen days from the commencement of his commitment to the custo-
    30  dy of the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is  accused
    31  of one or more offenses, at least one of which is a misdemeanor punisha-
    32  ble by a sentence of imprisonment of not more than three months and none
    33  of  which  is  a  crime punishable by a sentence of imprisonment of more
    34  than three months;
    35    (d) five days from the commencement of his commitment to  the  custody
    36  of  the sheriff in a criminal action wherein the defendant is accused of
    37  one or more offenses, at least one of which is a violation and  none  of
    38  which is a crime.
    39    3.  Whenever pursuant to this section a prosecutor states or otherwise
    40  provides notice that the people are ready for trial, the court may  make
    41  inquiry on the record as to their actual readiness. If, after conducting
    42  its  inquiry,  the  court  determines  that  the people are not ready to
    43  proceed to trial, the prosecutor's  statement  or  notice  of  readiness
    44  shall  not  be valid for purposes of this section. Following a demand to
    45  produce by a defendant pursuant to  section  240.20,  any  statement  of
    46  trial  readiness  must  be accompanied or preceded by a certification of
    47  good faith  compliance  with  the  disclosure  requirements  of  section
    48  240.20.  This subdivision shall not apply to cases where the defense has
    49  waived disclosure requirements.  The defense shall be afforded an oppor-
    50  tunity to be heard on the record concerning  any  such  inquiry  by  the
    51  court,  and  concerning  whether  such disclosure requirements have been
    52  met.
    53    3-a. Upon a misdemeanor complaint, a statement of readiness shall  not
    54  be  valid  unless  the  prosecuting  attorney  certifies that all counts
    55  charged in the accusatory instrument meet the requirements  of  sections

        A. 3055--A                          3
 
     1  100.15  and  100.40  and  those  counts  not meeting the requirements of
     2  sections 100.15 and 100.40 have been dismissed.
     3    4.  (a)  Subdivisions  one  and  two do not apply to a criminal action
     4  wherein the defendant is accused  of  an  offense  defined  in  sections
     5  125.10, 125.15, 125.20, 125.25, 125.26 and 125.27 of the penal law.
     6    (b)  A motion made pursuant to subdivisions one or two upon expiration
     7  of the specified period may be denied where the people are not ready for
     8  trial if the people were ready for trial prior to the expiration of  the
     9  specified  period  and  their  present unreadiness is due to some excep-
    10  tional fact or circumstance, including, but not limited to,  the  sudden
    11  unavailability  of  evidence  material  to  the  people's case, when the
    12  district attorney has exercised due diligence to  obtain  such  evidence
    13  and  there  are  reasonable  grounds  to believe that such evidence will
    14  become available in a reasonable period.
    15    (c) A motion made pursuant to subdivision two shall not:
    16    (i) apply to any defendant who is serving a term of  imprisonment  for
    17  another offense;
    18    (ii)  require  the  release  from custody of any defendant who is also
    19  being held in custody pending trial of another  criminal  charge  as  to
    20  which the applicable period has not yet elapsed;
    21    (iii)  prevent  the redetention of or otherwise apply to any defendant
    22  who, after being released from  custody  pursuant  to  this  section  or
    23  otherwise,  is  charged with another crime or violates the conditions on
    24  which he has been released, by failing to appear at a judicial  proceed-
    25  ing at which his presence is required or otherwise.
    26    [4.]  5.  In  computing the time within which the people must be ready
    27  for trial pursuant to subdivisions one and two,  the  following  periods
    28  must be excluded:
    29    (a)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay resulting from other proceedings
    30  concerning the defendant, including but not limited to: proceedings  for
    31  the determination of competency and the period during which defendant is
    32  incompetent  to  stand  trial;  demand to produce; request for a bill of
    33  particulars; pre-trial motions; appeals; trial of other charges; and the
    34  period during which such matters are under consideration by  the  court;
    35  or
    36    (b)  the  period  of delay resulting from a continuance granted by the
    37  court at the request of, or with the consent of, the defendant or his or
    38  her counsel. The court [must] may grant such a continuance only if it is
    39  satisfied that postponement is in the interest of justice,  taking  into
    40  account  the  public  interest  in  the  prompt dispositions of criminal
    41  charges. A  defendant  without  counsel  must  not  be  deemed  to  have
    42  consented  to  a  continuance unless he has been advised by the court of
    43  his or her rights under these rules and the effect of his consent, which
    44  must be done on the record in open court; or
    45    (c) (i) the period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailabil-
    46  ity of the defendant. A defendant must be considered absent whenever his
    47  location is unknown and he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prose-
    48  cution, or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defend-
    49  ant must be considered unavailable whenever his location  is  known  but
    50  his presence for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence; or
    51    (ii) where the defendant has either escaped from custody or has failed
    52  to appear when required after having previously been released on bail or
    53  on his own recognizance, and provided the defendant is not in custody on
    54  another  matter,  the  period  extending from the day the court issues a
    55  bench warrant pursuant to section  530.70  because  of  the  defendant's
    56  failure  to  appear  in  court  when  required, to the day the defendant

        A. 3055--A                          4
 
     1  subsequently appears in the court pursuant to a bench warrant or  volun-
     2  tarily or otherwise; or
     3    (d)  a  reasonable  period  of  delay when the defendant is joined for
     4  trial with a co-defendant as to whom the time for trial pursuant to this
     5  section has not run and good cause is not shown for  granting  a  sever-
     6  ance; or
     7    (e)  the  period of delay resulting from detention of the defendant in
     8  another jurisdiction provided the district attorney  is  aware  of  such
     9  detention  and  has  been  diligent  and  has made reasonable efforts to
    10  obtain the presence of the defendant for trial; or
    11    (f) the period during which the defendant is without  counsel  through
    12  no  fault  of  the court; except when the defendant is proceeding as his
    13  own attorney with the permission of the court; or
    14    (g) other periods of delay occasioned  by  exceptional  circumstances,
    15  including  but  not  limited  to,  the  period of delay resulting from a
    16  continuance granted at the request of a district  attorney  if  (i)  the
    17  continuance is granted because of the unavailability of evidence materi-
    18  al  to  the  people's case, when the district attorney has exercised due
    19  diligence to obtain such evidence and there are  reasonable  grounds  to
    20  believe that such evidence will become available in a reasonable period;
    21  or  (ii) the continuance is granted to allow the district attorney addi-
    22  tional time to prepare the people's case and additional time  is  justi-
    23  fied  by  the exceptional circumstances of the case.  Any such exclusion
    24  when a statement of unreadiness has followed a  statement  of  readiness
    25  made  by the people must be accompanied by supporting facts and approved
    26  by the court.  The court shall inquire on the record as to  the  reasons
    27  for the people's unreadiness; or
    28    (h)  the  period  during which an action has been adjourned in contem-
    29  plation of dismissal pursuant to sections 170.55, 170.56 and  215.10  of
    30  this chapter[.]; or
    31    (i)  [The]  the  period prior to the defendant's actual appearance for
    32  arraignment in a situation in which the defendant has been  directed  to
    33  appear by the district attorney pursuant to subdivision three of section
    34  120.20 or subdivision three of section 210.10[.]; or
    35    (j)  the period during which a family offense is before a family court
    36  until such time as an  accusatory  instrument  or  indictment  is  filed
    37  against the defendant alleging a crime constituting a family offense, as
    38  such term is defined in section 530.11 of this chapter.
    39    6.  At  each court appearance date preceding the commencement of trial
    40  in a criminal action, the court, whenever it is practicable  to  do  so,
    41  shall  rule  preliminarily on whether the adjournment period immediately
    42  following such court appearance date is to be included or  excluded  for
    43  the purposes of computing the time within which the people must be ready
    44  for  trial  within the meaning of this section. The court's ruling shall
    45  be noted in the court file.
    46    7. In computing the time within which the people  must  be  ready  for
    47  trial,  pursuant  to  subdivision  two or paragraphs (b), (c), or (d) of
    48  subdivision  one  of  this  section,  no  time  attributable  to   court
    49  congestion shall be excluded.
    50    [5.] 8. For purposes of this section, (a) where the defendant is to be
    51  tried following the withdrawal of the plea of guilty or is to be retried
    52  following  a  mistrial, an order for a new trial or an appeal or collat-
    53  eral attack, the criminal action and the commitment to  the  custody  of
    54  the  sheriff,  if  any, must be deemed to have commenced on the date the
    55  withdrawal of the plea of guilty or the date  the  order  occasioning  a
    56  retrial becomes final;

        A. 3055--A                          5
 
     1    (b)  where  a defendant has been served with an appearance ticket, the
     2  criminal action must be deemed to have commenced on the date the defend-
     3  ant first appears in a local criminal court in response to the ticket;
     4    (c)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
     5  complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
     6  either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
     7  tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
     8  article [180] one hundred eighty or a prosecutor's information is  filed
     9  pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
    10  subdivision one must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
    11  accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
    12  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
    13  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
    14  subdivision  [four] five, already elapsed from the date of the filing of
    15  the felony complaint to the date of the filing  of  the  new  accusatory
    16  instrument  exceeds  six months, the period applicable to the charges in
    17  the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
    18  accusatory instrument had not been filed;
    19    (d)  where  a  criminal  action is commenced by the filing of a felony
    20  complaint, and thereafter, in the course of  the  same  criminal  action
    21  either the felony complaint is replaced with or converted to an informa-
    22  tion,  prosecutor's  information  or  misdemeanor  complaint pursuant to
    23  article [180] one hundred eighty or a prosecutor's information is  filed
    24  pursuant  to  section  190.70, the period applicable for the purposes of
    25  subdivision two must be the period applicable to the charges in the  new
    26  accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
    27  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
    28  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
    29  subdivision  [four] five, already elapsed from the date of the filing of
    30  the felony complaint to the date of the filing  of  the  new  accusatory
    31  instrument  exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the charges in
    32  the felony complaint must remain applicable and continue as if  the  new
    33  accusatory instrument had not been filed.
    34    (e)  where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a misde-
    35  meanor or petty offense and  a  reduced  indictment  or  a  prosecutor's
    36  information  is  filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six of section
    37  210.20, the period applicable for the purposes  of  subdivision  one  of
    38  this  section  must  be  the period applicable to the charges in the new
    39  accusatory instrument, calculated from the date of the  filing  of  such
    40  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
    41  such  period  and  the period of time, excluding the periods provided in
    42  subdivision [four] five of this section, already elapsed from  the  date
    43  of  the  filing  of  the indictment to the date of the filing of the new
    44  accusatory instrument exceeds six months, the period applicable  to  the
    45  charges  in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if the
    46  new accusatory instrument had not been filed;
    47    (f) where a count of an indictment is reduced to charge only a  misde-
    48  meanor  or  petty  offense  and  a  reduced indictment or a prosecutor's
    49  information is filed pursuant to subdivisions one-a and six  of  section
    50  210.20,  the  period  applicable  for the purposes of subdivision two of
    51  this section must be the period applicable to the  charges  in  the  new
    52  accusatory  instrument,  calculated  from the date of the filing of such
    53  new accusatory instrument; provided, however, that when the aggregate of
    54  such period and the period of time, excluding the  periods  provided  in
    55  subdivision  [four]  five of this section, already elapsed from the date
    56  of the filing of the indictment to the date of the  filing  of  the  new

        A. 3055--A                          6
 
     1  accusatory  instrument exceeds ninety days, the period applicable to the
     2  charges in the indictment must remain applicable and continue as if  the
     3  new accusatory instrument had not been filed.
     4    [6.]  9.  The  procedural rules prescribed in subdivisions one through
     5  seven of section 210.45 with respect to a motion to dismiss  an  indict-
     6  ment are also applicable to a motion made pursuant to subdivision two.
     7    § 3. Subdivision 6 of section 180.85 of the criminal procedure law, as
     8  added by chapter 518 of the laws of 2004, is amended to read as follows:
     9    6.  The  period  from  the filing of a motion pursuant to this section
    10  until entry of an order disposing of such motion shall not, by reason of
    11  such motion, be considered a period of delay for purposes of subdivision
    12  [four] five of section 30.30, nor shall such period, by reason  of  such
    13  motion,  be  excluded in computing the time within which the people must
    14  be ready for trial pursuant to such section 30.30.
    15    § 4. This act shall take effect on the sixtieth  day  after  it  shall
    16  have become a law.
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